R&D, Agency Costs and Capital Structure: International Evidence by Sinclair Davidson & Robert Brooks
 
 






We examine the impact of R&D intensity and agency costs on the value of firms 
across 13 economies. We find that R&D adds value while high agency costs reduce 
value. R&D adds value, however, even when agency costs are high. We show that in 
those firms where agency costs are high and R&D intensity is high the debt control 
hypothesis is at work. In contrast to the stylized fact of high R&D firms having low 
levels of debt, these firms have higher levels of debt. 
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The field of corporate governance has arisen to explain how, why and when 
asymmetric information, and the associated agency problems, are managed in the 
modern firm (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). The major agency problem is that managers 
and directors may adopt corporate objectives inconsistent with long term 
maximisation of firm value. For example, they may retain excess free cash flow 
and/or undertake inefficient investments (Jensen 1986, 1989). Of course, managers 
may directly expropriate the firms’ assets and defraud the shareholders (Johnson et al. 
2001). R&D becomes particularly interesting when considered in an agency theory 
framework. Holmstrom (1989) indicates that innovation, and by extension R&D, has 
five unique characteristics, it is long term in nature, high risk in terms of the 
probability of failure, unpredictable in outcome, labor intensive and idiosyncratic. 
These characteristics combine to a net effect where R&D contributes to higher levels 
of asymmetric information and the mechanisms
1 to control that asymmetry are less 
potent. 
 
Shareholders are often able to observe the extent of R&D expenditure in the firm but 
cannot know what the product being developed is, nor the value of that product, nor 
the productivity of the firms’ R&D investment (see, however, Deng, Lev and Narin 
1999). Aboody and Lev (2000) argue that most firms do not participate in “innovation 
races”, i.e. R&D can be described as being “unique” and firm specific, consequently 
the behavior and performance of direct competitors is not a guide to firm 
performance. Further firms are likely to be secretive in the early stages of R&D 
activity and all the shareholders observe is a number in the financial statements. The 
empirical literature supports the notion that R&D is associated with asymmetric 
information. Kelm, Narayanan and Pinches (1995), for example, investigate capital  2
market responses to R&D over three stages of the R&D process. They report that the 
market responds favorably at the continuation and new–product stages of the process. 
Under conditions of symmetric information we would anticipate that the entire market 
reaction would be captured at the initiation announcement. Similarly, Aboody and 
Lev (2000) demonstrate that R&D characteristics greatly enhance asymmetric 
information by showing that (legal) insider trading gains in R&D firms are higher 
than non-R&D firms, and that the market reacts strongly to the announcement of 
insider trading. 
 
Debt policy and dividend policy are less likely to constrain R&D induced agency 
problems. If we follow Jensen (1986, 1989) by defining the agency problem as a 
dispute over free cash flow then these mechanisms are particularly ill suited to 
manage R&D induced agency problems. Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith and Serveas (2003), 
who use R&D as a measure of asymmetric information, find that agency problems are 
a prime cause of increased cash holdings and that high levels of R&D are associated 
with higher cash levels. It is plausible to believe, however, that R&D firms keep 
higher cash levels to finance the R&D activity itself. Certainly, firms cannot, or do 
not, pay out cash when they undertake high R&D activity. Higher dividends, then, are 
not the solution. In any event it is expected that firms with high growth options would 
have a lower dividend payout ratio (La Porta et al. 2000). A priori, the typical R&D 
firm would likely have many growth options. 
 
The issues relating to debt policy are more complex. Following the Myers-Majluf 
(1984) pecking order theory we might expect R&D to be financed by retained 
earnings (consistent with having higher cash balances) and then by debt. Titman and  3
Wessels (1988), however, report that having “unique” assets is associated with lower 
debt levels. The logic being, first, that consumers will only buy unique products if 
they are confident that the firm will survive to provide after-sales service. Second, the 
lack of a secondary market for R&D and the non-collaterability of R&D activity 
mitigates against debt-financed R&D activity. Further, Shi (2003) indicates that R&D 
activity, which increases the market value of equity, also increases bond default risk 
and debt risk premia. Bond holders, ceteris paribus, may be unwilling to hold the risks 
associated with greater R&D activity. In contrast, however, Zantout (1997) reports 
that shareholder gains from R&D announcements are not associated with bondholder 
losses. This would seem to indicate that debt can be valuable to R&D intensive firms. 
Despite this type of result, Bah and Dumontier (2001) report that R&D intensive firms 
have significantly lower levels of debt than do non-R&D intensive firms. Generally, it 
is accepted as a stylized fact that R&D is associated with less debt in the firm’s capital 
structure. 
 
In this paper we investigate the interaction of R&D activity and agency costs on the 
value of publicly listed firms. Our data set employs over 24,000 firm years from 
thirteen high income economies. We make two contributions to the literature. First we 
investigate the impact of agency problems on R&D valuation. Our measure of agency 
problems is the asset to sales ratio. Ang, Cole and Lin (2000) show this variable to be 
highly related to agency problems. We are able to show that firms with low agency 
problems are more valuable ceteris paribus than firms with high agency problems. It 
appears that the act of undertaking R&D increases the value of the firm irrespective of 
agency costs. We also document country specific and industry specific versions of our 
model. Our second contribution is related to the first. We would anticipate that high  4
agency cost firms would not undertake R&D activity or, if they did, that R&D activity 
would have a negative valuation effect. Investors might consider R&D expenditure 
under those circumstances as asset diversion. We report, however, a positive valuation 
effect. Furthermore, for those (high agency cost) firms, we also report higher levels of 
debt. It appears that high R&D – high agency cost firms employ more debt in their 
capital structures apparently as a corporate governance mechanism. This result is 
consistent with the debt control hypothesis (Jensen 1986). It is also consistent with 
Zantout (1997) who reports that the stock market reaction to R&D expenditure 
announcements is positively related to the firms’ debt ratio. 
 
To the best of our knowledge there is little research into the relationship between 
agency problems and R&D activity. Jensen (1993) uses R&D expenditure to 
demonstrate that internal corporate governance control mechanisms are ineffective. 
Francis and Smith (1995), using US data, report that diffusely–held firms are less 
innovative than closely held firms. Lee and O’Neill (2003) compare ownership 
concentration and R&D activity in Japan and the US. They confirm that ownership 
concentration is positively related to R&D in the US, but find no such relationship for 
Japan. Cui and Mak (2002) use the Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) approach to 
investigate the relationship between insider ownership and Tobin Q for high R&D 
firms. They report a W–shaped relationship and interpret the results as indicating that 
higher levels of ownership are required to substitute for poor board governance in 
these types of firms. Chung, Wright and Kedia (2003) report the relationship between 
firm value (measured by Tobin Q) and R&D depends on corporate governance. 
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R&D can be, and is, used to smooth earnings (Bange and De Bondt 1998). To the 
extent that smoothed earnings signal high quality firms (Dye 1988, Chaney and Lewis 
1995) R&D activity may assist in reducing asymmetric information problems and the 
associated agency problems leading to higher share prices (Lev and Kunitzky 1974). 
Earnings management may be valuable in the US, however, the international evidence 
is less sanguine. Bhattacharya, Daouk and Welker (2001) find, in an international 
comparison of 40 economies, that earnings management is associated with a higher 
cost of equity capital. Leuz, Nanda and Wysochi (2001) report that earnings 
management is associated with weaker protection of investor rights and consequently 
greater levels of agency cost. 
 
Some studies approach the issue of R&D and agency costs indirectly when 
investigating investment myopia. R&D is often used as a proxy for long term 
investment that is particularly subject to myopia. For example, Knoeber (1986) and 
Pugh, Page and Jahera (1992) report that R&D rises after firms adopt anti-takeover 
measures. Meulbroek et al. (1990), however, report opposite result. Bushee (1998) 
indicates that firms with “passive” investors, following buy and hold strategies, are 
less likely to cut R&D after declines in earnings. Lundstrum (2002) provides an 
argument where myopia is the solution to an agency problem. He reports a negative 
relationship between R&D and CEO age and argues this is induced by shareholders in 
order to reduce the costs of future hold-up (i.e. shareholders prefer firms to 
underinvest rather than pay hold-up costs in future). Barket and Mueller (2002) also 
find a negative relationship between CEO age and R&D activity. They also find, 
however, that R&D increases with CEO tenure implying, to their minds, that CEOs 
“mold” R&D expenditure to their own preferences. R&D also features in the  6
managerial compensation literature. For example, DeFusco, Zorn and Johnson (1991) 
report that managers tend to increase debt and reduce R&D expenditure after stock 
option plans are adopted. Nam, Ottoo and Thornton (2003) investigate the impact of 
stock option plans on debt ratios and R&D. They differentiate between price effects 
and volatility effects of option plans. The greater the price effect from a stock option 
plan the lower the investment in R&D. The less risk averse managers are (greater 
volatility effects) the higher the R&D investment. Of particular interest to us is that 
Nam et al. (2003) report stronger relationships between managerial incentives and 
R&D in those firms with lower levels of external monitoring. Inefficient incentive 
structures and low monitoring would lead to inefficient R&D decisions. Their results 
seem to suggest that firms with low levels of monitoring may overinvest in R&D and 
firms with high levels of monitoring may underinvest in R&D. Nam et al. (2003), 
however, are unable to directly test this view.  
 
The remainder of the paper is set out as follows. Section I sets out the basic model 
that we employ. Section II contains a discussion of our data and section III contains 
results. In section IV we discuss whether debt constrains agency problems in high 
R&D firms. Section V contains a discussion and conclusion. 
 
I. The Valuation Effects of R&D Expenditure 
 
There is a broad consensus in the literature that R&D activity adds value. Many of the 
studies that confirm this view are event–study orientated. For example, the classic 
Chan, Martin and Kensinger (1990) examined the stock market response of 95 
announcements, over a six year period, of increased R&D expenditure. More recently,  7
Eberhart, Maxwell and Siddique (forthcoming) examined 8,313 instances, over a fifty 
year period, of increased R&D expenditure. Other studies, such as Chan, Lakonishok 
and Sougiannis (2001), evaluate whether R&D is related to stock returns using asset–
pricing theory. Finally some studies, such as Chung, Wright and Kedia (2003) and 
Hall and Orani (2003), employ cross section techniques relating R&D to various 
measures of market value. The most used measure of market value is some proxy for 
Tobin Q. We follow the latter approach by relating R&D and our measure of agency 
costs to Q. 
 
The basic version of our model is set out below. 
Qi,t = α0 +α1Log(Assetsi,t) + α2DYi,t + α3Debt-Assetsi,t + α4RoAi,t + α5RD-Salesi,t + 
α6Agencyi,t + Industry + Country + Annual + εi,t          (1) 
Where Qi,t is our proxy for Tobin Q (market value of equity plus book value of assets 
less book value of shareholder equity all divided by book value of assets). 
Log(Assetsi,t) is the natural logarithm of book value of assets and is a proxy for size. 
DYi,t is the firm’s dividend yield and Debt-Assetsi,t is book value of total debt to book 
value of total assets
2, RoAi,t is accounting return on assets, RD-Salesi,t is reported 
R&D expense to net sales and Agencyi,t is the assets to sales ratio. The basic model 
includes dummy variables indicating country of origin and industry. 
 
We expand our basic model, using dummy variables, to differentiate between firms 
that have high and low levels of R&D and high and low levels of agency costs. In this 
respect our analysis is similar to that in Chan et al. (1990) who differentiate between 
high tech and low tech firms and Szewczyk, Tsetsekos and Zantout (1996) and  8
Eberhart et al. (forthcoming) who differentiate between high growth and low growth 
firms. 
 
Size, dividend yield, debt-asset ratios and return on assets are all control variables. 
We are interested primarily in the R&D intensity variable, in the agency variable and 
particularly the interactions between those variables. The agency variable we employ 
in equation (1) is from Ang, Cole and Lin (2000). They investigate two measures of 
agency cost in a sample of small unlisted firms in the US. Their first measure is 
operating expense to sales and their second measure is the sales to assets ratio. This 
latter variable is the proxy we employ. Ang et al. indicate that this variable measures 
the loss in revenue due to inefficient or inappropriate asset usage (p.82). Cole et al. 
indicate that low sales to asset ratios indicate higher agency costs. In order to simplify 
the discussion we have taken the inverse (assets to sales) as our measure of agency 
costs and higher measures of the ratio would be related to having higher agency costs. 
 
We hypothesize that R&D intensive firms with low agency costs will be more 
valuable than R&D intensive firms with high agency costs. In general we would 
anticipate that firms with high levels of agency cost will not undertake R&D as the 
market will not value that R&D as an investment, but rather as asset diversion and 
tunneling. To the extent that high agency cost firms do undertake R&D there may 
well be a negative relationship between R&D intensity and firm value. Similarly, we 
expect R&D intensive firms to be more valuable in economies that better “manage” 
asymmetric information problems, e.g. common law economies. Similarly, market–
based financial systems are more likely to encourage R&D activity and consequently 
will value R&D more highly than bank–based economies. Allen and Gale (2000)  9
summarize the literature in this regard. In short, market–based financial systems have 
well developed information distribution mechanisms and are able to allocate capital to 
activities even when investors hold diverse views on the value of the investment. 
Conversely, bank–based systems operate with a high degree of consensus. Investors 
are less willing to provide finance to new and high risk investments. Bank–based 
financial systems do well in routinized “traditional” industries. Carlin and Mayer 
(2003) provide empirical evidence consistent with this view. Conversely, Beck and 
Levine (2002) argue that given the legal system, the basis of the financial system 
(bank–based or market–based) is not too important. 
 
Our model is close, in spirit, to that of Hall and Oriani (2003). The purpose of their 
paper is to compare European (France, Germany and Italy) R&D firm valuation to 
Anglo-Saxon (UK and US) R&D firm valuation. They employ panel data techniques 
and a production function approach determines their valuation model. In essence, 
however, Hall and Oriani (2003) are using a Tobin Q approach similar to ours. They 
are able to report R&D valuation effects that are three time larger for the UK than for 
France and Germany. In particular, they report that the coefficient on R&D is less 
than unity (one). This implies, assuming efficient markets, that some firms overinvest 
in R&D (i.e. the assets created by the “investment” are less valuable than the amount 
paid for them). While our model specification is not exactly equivalent to that in Hall 
and Oriani (2003) we interpret our results for low agency cost firms as making an 
“optimal” investment in R&D and for high agency cost firms as an overinvestment in 
R&D. Our paper differs from Hall and Oriani (2003) in that they do not include 
agency costs in their model. 
II. Data  10
 
A. Sample Construction 
 
Data are collected from the Osiris Database (December 2002 file) for thirteen high 
income economies where firms report R&D expenditure and that data are included in 
the database. Osiris is one of a suite of databases owned by Bureau van Dijk.
3 Bureau 
van Dijk standardizes accounting information with the explicit objective of achieving 
uniformity and allowing international comparison and cross-border analysis. Bureau 
van Dijk claim that the standardized information have been approved by accounting 
bodies and practitioners in each economy and the data entry procedures include 
rigorous checking with many data fields subject to automatic validation. The 
economies in our sample are, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Israel, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and the US.
4 All data are 
recorded in US dollars. Most research into R&D activity is undertaken using US or 
UK data. The data for these economies are easily available and, in particular, R&D 
activity is reported in the annual financial statements. R&D coverage for other 
economies is less comprehensive with voluntary disclosure being the norm. Those 
papers that do employ international data have to rely on voluntary disclosure which 
may introduce selectivity bias into the results. Hall and Oriani (2003), however, report 
that many (and even most) European R&D firms report their R&D activity. A second 
source of “international” bias is the difference in accounting conventions across 
economies. In the US and UK firms have long been required to report R&D activity 
(1974 and 1989) which must (generally) be expensed in the income statement. Other 
economies allow for expensing or, in some specific instances, capitalization (Lev 
1999). We follow Bhagat and Welch (1995) in arguing that differences in accounting  11
convention have to be tolerated. Unlike Bhagat and Welch (1995) we do pool the data 
in addition to running country specific models. As in the Bhagat and Welch (1995) 
paper the accounting differences should not affect the individual country analysis. In 
the pooled equations we include individual country dummies and also estimate 
equations where we group economies by whether they have a common law or civil 
law legal system and by whether they are market–based or bank–based. It is well 
known and documented that accounting conventions are systematically related to 
variables such as these.
5 Finally, tax incentives for R&D vary across economies. 
Despite the potential for accounting and policy induced bias, international 
comparisons are worthwhile. The scope for agency problems and the mechanisms to 
deal with them, the mechanisms for mobilizing resources and the efficiency of capital 
markets all vary across economies. The ability of markets to value physical and non-
physical capital will vary too. These differences are likely to be more important when 
considering R&D valuation, and public policy toward R&D, than the sources of 
empirical bias. 
 
B. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Data are collected for industrial firms only (not banks or insurance firms). Our sample 
period is 1999 – 2001. We obtain data for 15,531 firms. This results in 46,593 firm 
years. There are 21,539 firm years with at least one missing observation which we 
then exclude from the analysis. This results in 25,054 firm years. Finally we exclude 
364 observations in the regression analysis which we identify as outliers. Summary 
statistics (25,054 firm years) are shown in table I. 
TABLE ONE ABOUT HERE  12
 
Table I shows the total number of firm years per economy in the sample and also the 
number of firm years that have reported R&D expenditure. We assume that all firms 
that undertake R&D also report R&D expenditure. Consequently firms that do not 
have any reported R&D are assumed to not undertake any R&D and are recorded as 
zero. The first row of the table shows the average Q, RD-Sales % and Asset-Sales % 
for all observations across all economies. The next 13 rows show the equivalent data 
for each economy. The overall average level of R&D expenditure is very high at 
91.83 percent. This, however, is a US effect. The US data indicate a very high level of 
R&D expenditure at 211.66 percent of net sales with US firms making up forty 
percent of all observations and 56.40 percent of all R&D firms.
6 
 
Economies are also grouped together on the basis of their financial structure (either 
market–based or bank–based) following Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic’s (2002) 
classification and on their legal origin, based on the LaPorta et al. (1997) 
classification. Average values for Q, RD-Sales % and Asset-Sales % are also reported 
in table I. With respect to RD-Sales% both Market–based and Common Law 
economies (which include the US) have extremely high averages relative to Bank–
based and Civil Law economies. Immediately below the Market and Common Law 
rows, however, the same statistics are calculated excluding the US data. It is still the 
case that Common Law and Market–based economies undertake, on average, higher 
levels of R&D activity relative to sales than do Bank–based and Civil Law 
economies. Our proxy for agency costs also captures important variation in the 
sample. When the US is included, Common Law and Market–based economies have a 
lower agency costs score, on average, than do Civil Law and Bank–based economies.  13
When the US is excluded, however, that figure rises above that of the Civil Law and 
Bank–based economies. The relative valuation of firms, given by Q, indicates that 
firms in Common Law and Market – based economies are, on average, more valuable 
than those in Civil Law and Bank–based economies. This is consistent with results in 
LaPorta et al. (1999). 
 
Finally the table shows the break down of data by industry. Osiris records four digit 
SIC data for firms. We use that data to allocate firms to one of ten industry groupings 
following the SIC classification as per Appendix 1. The results in table one show 
variation in R&D intensity. We have three industries with very high R&D intensity, 
Industry 2 (Primary, Chemical and Petroleum Industries), Industry 7 (Personal and 
Business Services) and Industry 8 (Service (Other) Industries). Later in the analysis 
these three industries will be combined together to form a “high” R&D intensity 
grouping. In contrast, five of the industries have R&D to Sales ratios of less than ten 
percent. These five groupings will be used later as a “low” R&D intensity group. Our 
sample clearly captures a range of R&D behavior. The two industries with the highest 
R&D intensity (Industry 2 and Industry 8) also show the highest average measures of 
agency costs. Low R&D intensity industries, however, also show high average agency 
costs. 
 
Table II shows a comparison between firms that undertake R&D and those that do 
not. Firms that undertake R&D tend to be more valuable, larger but less profitable 
than those that do not undertake R&D. The debt-assets ratio for R&D firms is lower 
than that of non-R&D firms. There is no statistical difference between agency costs in 
the two types of firm and no statistical difference in dividend yield.  14
 
TABLE TWO ABOUT HERE 
 
Table III contains the summary statistics for the data used to estimate equation (1). As 
a first approximation equation (1) was estimated and outliers were identified and 
removed.
7 The summary statistics reported in table three exclude those outliers and 
reflect the data that are actually used in the regression analysis. Panel A indicates the 
mean, median, maximum, minimum and standard deviations of the data, while panel 
B indicates correlation coefficients and panel C reports variance inflation factors. The 
summary statistics in panel A indicate that the sample has captured a wide degree of 
variability in the variables given the range between the minimum and maximum 
values. A comparison of the mean and median values shows that most of the variables 
have a skewed distribution. The correlation coefficients in panel B show low 
correlations amongst the independent variables. Together with the low variance 
inflation factors reported in panel C this indicates that multicollinearity is unlikely to 
be an issue in the regression analysis. 
 
TABLE THREE HERE 
 
III. Results 
A. Regression Results for Pooled Data 
 
Table IV contains the basic regression analysis. Column one shows the base case 
version of equation (1).
8 In terms of the very basic model it appears that undertaking 
R&D activity has a statistically significant positive impact on the value of the firm.  15
While the RD-Sales coefficient is significantly different from zero, it is much smaller 
than unity. Hall and Oriani (2003) also find R&D coefficients to be less than unity – 
indicating that firms are overinvesting in R&D. In column two we include our 
measure of agency costs. It, however, is not statistically significant. In column three 
we create two dummy variables, HighRD-Sales and LowRD-Sales. These variables 
take on a value of one when the ratio of R&D to sales is above the 75
th percentile or 
below the 25
th percentile.
9 Firms with high levels of R&D are relatively more valuable 
and firms with low levels of R&D are relatively less valuable. In column four we 
perform a similar exercise when we create a HighAsset-Sales and a LowAsset-Sales 
variable. Again each of these variables indicates firms above and below the 75
th and 
25
th percentiles for the Asset-Sales ratio. Unsurprisingly, those firms with low agency 
costs are more valuable compared to those with high agency costs. The final column 
(5) includes interaction effects.
10 Consistent with the results in column three, firms 
that undertake high levels of R&D are more valuable than those that undertake less 
R&D. Similarly, for a given level of R&D low agency cost firms are more valuable 
than high agency cost firms. It is worth noting that high R&D – high agency costs 
firms are relatively more valuable than are low R&D – low agency cost firms. 
Undertaking R&D is a valuable activity despite agency costs. It does suggest, 
however, that high agency costs in R&D intensive firms are constrained or managed 
in some way.
11 The other observation is the size of the coefficient on high R&D – low 
agency costs firms. It has a standard error of 0.071417 (not reported here) indicating 
that the coefficient (0.934727) is not statistically significantly different from one. 
While the interaction variable is not equivalent to the test in Hall and Oriani (2003), to 
our minds, this indicates that these firms are making an appropriate investment in 
R&D. On this logic high agency cost firms that do undertake R&D overinvest.  16
Nonetheless undertaking R&D is valued by the market, as low R&D firms – 
irrespective of agency costs – are less valuable. 
 
TABLE FOUR HERE 
 
B. Regression Results for Country Data 
 
Table V shows the results of equation (1), as specified in column one of table four, on 
a country by country basis. It also shows the results for market-based and bank–based 
economies and common law and civil law economies. In seven of the thirteen 
economies the RD-Sales coefficient is positive and statistically significantly different 
from zero. (In the case of France, the coefficient is negative and significant at the 10 
percent level). In no instance is it anywhere near unity. Indicating, on average, that the 
valuation effect of R&D is less than the investment in R&D (i.e. over-investment). It 
is not obvious what Greece, Israel, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK have in 
common – apart from the RD-Sales coefficient not being statistically significantly 
different from zero. In order to explore the issue further, equation (1) is re-estimated 
for Market–based and Bank–based economies and then for Common Law and Civil 
Law economies. Finally the Market–based and Common Law equations are re-
estimated without the US data to determine if a US effect is at work. The RD-Sales 
coefficient is positive and statistically significant in Market–based and Common Law 
economies, but not Bank–based and Civil Law economies. As can be seen from the 
final row in the table this result is not a US effect. The result for Bank–based 
economies is consistent with the financial structure literature indicating that R&D 
activity is likely to be less valuable in Bank–based economies (Carlin and Mayer  17
2003). Similarly the law and finance literature indicates that Civil Law economies 
would be less efficient in managing the asymmetric information problems associated 
with R&D and so it would be less valuable in those economies, on average. 
 
TABLE FIVE HERE 
 
Table VI shows the extended version of equation (1) from column Five of table four 
(i.e. the equation with interactions between the R&D and agency variables) on a 
country by country basis. Just as in table V the equation is estimated for bank–based 
and market–based economies and for Common Law and Civil Law economies (with 
and without the US). High R&D – high agency cost firms are less valuable in Greece 
and Switzerland and more valuable in Japan and the US. For low agency cost firms a 
high level of R&D adds value in Canada, Germany, Japan, the UK and the US. Low 
levels of R&D in a high agency cost firm add value in Ireland and in Switzerland. 
Otherwise in Canada, Germany, the UK and the US low R&D in a high agency cost 
firm reduces value. Finally, low R&D – low agency cost firms are less valuable in 
France, Greece, the UK and the US, but more valuable in Denmark. When re-
estimating the equations by financial structure and legal family, however, the results 
indicate that R&D activity creates value overall. The greatest contribution to value 
appears to occur when agency costs are low and the firm is in either a Market–based 
or Common Law economy. In those economies the HighRD*LowAsset-Sales 
coefficient is not statistically significantly different from one. These results do not 
appear to be a US effect. In bank–based and civil law economies, however, the 
HighRD*LowAsset-Sales coefficient is statistically significantly different from one. 
  18
TABLE SIX HERE 
 
C. Regression Results for Industry Data 
 
In tables VII and VIII the analysis is repeated with industries instead of economies. In 
general, the results are qualitatively similar to those reported earlier. In table VII we 
show that undertaking R&D reduces value in Industries one (Mineral Industries) and 
nine (Public Administration), while it adds value in industries three (Manufacturing 
and Equipment), five (Wholesale and Retail Trade), six (Finance, Insurance and Real 
Estate) and seven (Personal and Business Services). There does not, however, appear 
to be any pattern between the average Q for the industry (shown in table one) and the 
extent to which the RD-Sales coefficient is positive or statistically significant. In table 
VIII we do not show results for industry nine (Public Administration) as there are 
only 16 firm years in that industry. In one of the low R&D intensity industries 
(industry four) the interaction variables are not statistically significant at all while in 
the others they exhibit similar patterns to before. While some of the 
HighRD*LowAsset-Sales coefficients appear to be quite large they are not 
statistically different from one.
12 
 
TABLES SEVEN and EIGHT HERE 
 
We then investigate whether there are any differences between high and low R&D 
intensity industries and whether those differences vary by legal system and/or 
financial system. We combine industries two (Primary, Chemical and Petroleum 
Industries), seven (Personal and Business Services) and eight (Service (Other)  19
Industries) into a single High R&D intensity category and the other industries are 
combined into a Low R&D intensity category.
13 Results are shown in tables IX and X. 
We also show results for High and Low R&D intensity across Market–based, Bank–
based, Common Law and Civil Law economies. The first striking difference between 
table IX and table VII is the coefficients on Dividend Yield. Previously, that 
coefficient was generally negative or statistically insignificant. For high intensity 
R&D industries it is positive and statistically significant. A second feature of table IX 
worth highlighting relates to the coefficient RD-Sales. It is not statistically significant 
for high intensity R&D industries in Bank–based economies and similarly is not 
significant in Civil law economies for either high or low R&D intensive industries. 
Results in table X are qualitatively similar. 
 
TABLES NINE and TEN HERE 
 
IV. Does debt constrain agency problems in high R&D firms? 
 
We now turn our attention to the fact that we find a value additive effect to R&D in 
high agency cost firms. In table XI we segment our data by high and low R&D and 
high and low agency costs and calculate summary statistics for the interactions of 
these variables. We then examine whether the segmented data is statistically different 
from the unsegmented data. Importantly, for our purposes, HighRD*LowAsset-Sales 
firms have lower debt than do other firms. This is a stylized fact in the R&D 
literature, consistent with results from Bah and Dumontier (2001) – firms that 
undertake R&D have less debt. 
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HighRD*HighAsset-Sales firms have more debt compared to all other firms. This 
result is inconsistent with the previous literature into R&D activity, but is consistent 
with the debt control hypothesis (Jensen 1986). High levels of debt constrain 
managerial opportunism forcing decision makers to undertake economically viable 
investments and exit unprofitable activity. Those firms that are likely to have 
economically viable R&D activity but are also likely to have high levels of agency 
costs may well use debt levels to signify their bona fides. 
 
TABLE ELEVEN HERE 
 
In table XII we identify these firms by economy and industry. It would be easy to 
argue that our result in table XI is simply an artifact or is particular to a specific 
industry. A glance at table XII, however, indicates that these high R&D – high agency 
cost firms are not confined to a particular economy or particular industry. There are 
no such firms in Ireland or Industry Nine (Public Administration). On the other hand, 
most such firms are located in the US. Within the US, almost half (43.7 percent) are in 
Industry 3 (Manufacturing and Equipment). In short, high R&D – high agency cost 
firms are not confined to a single industry or economy. While about half of the firms 
are located in the US, the remaining firms are spread across the world. 
 
TABLE TWELVE HERE 
 
In table XIII we segment the data into high R&D and high and low agency cost 
groups and re-estimate the basic version of equation (1). As can be seen in the 
HighRD*HighAsset-Sales sample firms with high higher debt-equity ratios are more  21
valuable whereas in the HighRD*LowAsset-Sales sample they are not. This we 
ascribe to debt being used as a control mechanism in these firms. 
 
TABLE THIRTEEN HERE 
 
V. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
To the best of our knowledge this is the first paper to investigate the relationship 
between R&D intensity and agency costs in a large cross-section of economies. 
Consistent with the literature, we have found that R&D activity is value relevant and 
that investors view R&D activity as a wealth enhancing investment. Similarly, we 
find that high agency costs are value destroying. We report that undertaking R&D 
dominates agency costs in a valuation sense. This is unexpected as we would have 
anticipated that firms with high agency costs would not normally undertake R&D 
activity. Given high agency costs and the inherent uncertainty of the R&D process we 
did not anticipate that investors would view R&D in high agency cost firms as an 
investment. 
 
It appears that there is a sub-set of firms that have high agency problems, yet 
undertake R&D activity. These firms have a credibility problem. How are they able to 
convince the market that any R&D expenditure is an investment and not the 
manifestation of an agency problem? A priori we believe that the usual mechanisms to 
constrain agency problems would be less effective when dealing with R&D induced 
asymmetric information. It is a stylized fact in the literature that high growth firms 
and those that undertake high levels of R&D would have low debt levels and low, if  22
not zero, dividend payouts. For the bulk of firms this appears to be the case. For those 
firms with high agency costs, however, that is not the case. From the analysis shown 
here it appears that firms in high R&D intensity industries are more valuable if they 
have a higher dividend yield. At the individual firm level it appears that those firms 
with high R&D and high agency costs are more valuable if they have a higher debt 
ratio. We also compared our results across legal systems and financial systems. R&D 
appears to be more valuable in those economies that better manage asymmetric 
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Table I: Country and Industry Statistics. Total Firms indicates the number of firms in 
the data base. R&D firms are those firms that have reported R&D activity and are 
captured in the Osiris Database. RD-Sales is the percentage of R&D expense to Net 
Sales, Q is a proxy for Tobin Q. Market indicates a group of market-orientated 
economies and Bank indicates a group of bank-orientated economies. Economies are 
allocated as being market or bank orientated based on Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (2002). Common and Civil indicate the legal origin of the economy and 
is taken from LaPorta et al. (1997). SIC codes for all firms are collected and firms are 














All 2.19  91.83  205.50  25054  6704  26.76 
Canada 1.64  48.87  328.47  1281  308  24.04 
Denmark 2.03  5.88  126.01  249  43  17.27 
France 2.07  5.89  523.85  1533  139  9.07 
Germany 1.97  2.15  440.31  1062  224  21.09 
Greece 3.32  0.30  123.10  171  49  28.66 
Ireland 1.96  1.90  125.48  119  28  23.53 
Israel 1.56  15.46  141.36  44  30  68.18 
Japan 1.50  0.55  116.41  6615  1122  16.96 
Netherlands 2.03  2.42  142.58 419  55 13.13 
Sweden 2.28  28.70  174.23  548  138  25.18 
Switzerland 1.61  2.03  180.14 449 152  33.85 
UK 2.25  30.85  229.74  2523  635  25.17 
US 2.76  211.66  179.05  10041  3781  37.66 
Market 2.53  154.09  199.40  14812  4917  33.20 
Bank 1.69  1.78  214.33  10242  1787  17.45 
Common 2.55  161.81  201.27  14008  4782  34.14 
Civil 1.73  3.09  210.87  11046  1922  17.40 
Market (ex-US)  2.07  32.94  242.22  4771  1136  23.81 
Common (ex-US)  2.04  35.63  257.51  3967  1001  25.23 
Industry0 1.56  0.53  244.54  93  24  25.81 
Industry1 1.40  11.36  242.11  1793  318  17.74 
Industry2 2.15  263.14  319.53  4189  1324  31.61 
Industry3 2.07  41.62  123.75  7468  3101  41.52 
Industry4 1.81  6.94  258.76  2095  222  10.60 
Industry5 1.82  2.47 165.40 3671 209  5.69 
Industry6 1.86  1.74 233.56 1464  46  3.14 
Industry7 3.67  193.43  143.02  3412  1278  37.46 
Industry8 2.38  213.01  526.99  850  179  21.06 
Industry9 1.75  0.77  114.65  16 3  18.75 
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Table II: Comparison for firms with and without R&D. The row marked F contains p-
values from a F-test for equality of variances and the row marked t contains p-values 
from a two-sided t-test for equality of means (unequal variances). 
Panel A: 
R&D Firms  Q Asset-Sales Debt-Assets DY Log(Assets) RoA 
Mean 2.5773  199.8413  49.4216  0.8906  12.4676  -14.6014 
Median 1.6300  88.0400  45.5849  0.0000  12.3801  1.3500 
Std. Dev.  2.4377  2515.8230 39.4557 2.9798  2.2905 52.3312 
N 6474  6474  6474  6474  6474  6474 
            
Panel B: 
Non R&D Firms  Q Asset-Sales Debt-Assets DY Log(Assets) RoA 
Mean 1.4730  213.6600  58.2298  9.1365  12.3633  0.3345 
Median 1.0900  100.2450  58.1945  0.8185  12.1770  3.4300 
Std. Dev.  1.2894  3891.1430 30.9689 729.4479 1.8746  26.4637 
N 18216  18216  18216  18216  18216  18216 
            
F 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
t 0.0000  0.7453  0.0000  0.1271  0.0010  0.0000 
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Table III: Summary Statistics for Equation (1). Panel A contains mean, median, 
maximum, minimum and standard deviation data, while panel B contains correlation 




Summary  Q Debt-Assets DY RD-Sales
 
Asset-Sales RoA Log(Assets)
 Mean  1.7626  55.9202  6.9744  88.4725 210.0366 -3.5818  12.3907 
 Median  1.1700  55.5237  0.2961  0.0000  96.5300  3.0400  12.2151 
 Max  26.23  1848.95  96589.22 486500.00 336346.70 277.45 20.02 
 Min  0.0200  0.0649  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  -780.7700  3.0445 
 Std. Dev.  1.7379  33.6290  626.5643 4352.3080 3581.9230 35.7470 1.9925 
 N  24690  24690  24690  24690  24690  24690 24690 
Panel B: 
Correlations Q  Debt-Equity DY  RDSales 
 
Asset-Sales RoA Log(Assets)
Debt-Assets 0.0536             
DY -0.0084  -0.0083           
RD-Sales 0.0494  -0.0137  -0.0002         
Asset-Sales 0.0068  -0.0166  -0.0002  0.0144       
RoA -0.4004  -0.2545  0.0351  -0.0394  -0.0010     
Log(Assets) -0.1755  0.0976 0.0109 -0.0221  -0.0132  0.2783   
Panel C: 
VIF   1.1064  1.0012  1.0024 
 
1.0006 1.1900 1.1210 
  32
Table IV: Results of Regression (1). Dependant variable is Tobin Q. Independent 
variables are Log(Assets), the Dividend-Yield (%) (DY), the book value of total debt 
to book value of total assets (%) (Debt-Assets), the return on Assets (%), R&D to 
Sales (%) and Asset-Sales. The numbers in parentheses are White (1980) adjusted p-
values. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
C 2.465236 2.464355 2.509944 2.453821 2.458774 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Log(Assets) -0.035462 -0.035398 -0.058061 -0.038320 -0.045806 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
DY 0.000009 0.000009 0.000010 0.000009 0.000006 
  (0.1510) (0.1512) (0.0628) (0.1322) (0.2792) 
Debt-Assets -0.001257 -0.001251 0.000362 -0.000873 0.000390 
  (0.3218) (0.3240) (0.7489) (0.4840) (0.7367) 
RoA -0.017544 -0.017542 -0.015340 -0.017209 -0.015400 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
RD-Sales 0.000012 0.000012 0.000010 0.000011 0.000009 
  (0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0257) (0.0150) (0.0456) 
Asset-Sales   0.000003      
   (0.3981)       
HighRD-Sales     0.691788    
     (0.00000    
Low-RD-Sales     -0.133762    
     (0.0294)       
HighAsset-Sales      -0.055592  
      (0.0229)   
LowAsset-Sales      0.170352  
      (0.0000)   
HighRD*HighAsset-Sales      0.478635 
       (0.0000) 
HighRD*LowAsset-Sales       0.934727 
       (0.0000) 
LowRD*HighAsset-Sales       -0.203781 
       (0.0000) 
LowRD*LowAsset-Sales       -0.146419 
       (0.0000) 
Adj-R
2  0.2254 0.2254 0.2585 0.2274 0.2480 
Country  Dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry  Dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Annual  Dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N  24690 24690 24690 24690 24690 
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Table V: Country Regressions. Dependant variable is Tobin Q. Independent variables 
are Log(Assets), the Dividend-Yield (%) (DY), the book value of total debt to book 
value of assets (%) (Debt-Assets), the Return on Assets (%), R&D to Sales (%) and 
Asset-Sales. Industry dummies are included in all regressions. The numbers in 
parentheses are White (1980) adjusted p-values. 
 C  Log(Assets) DY  Debt-Assets RoA  RDSales  Adj-R
2 N 
Canada 2.184254  -0.067126  0.000011 0.002826 -0.013074 0.000213  0.2387 1266
 (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.1083)  (0.0741) (0.0000)  (0.0289)     
Denmark 2.447615  0.091147  -0.004563 -0.029842  -0.001993 0.006578  0.1605  245 
 (0.00170  (0.0625)  (0.1543)  (0.0029) (0.8547)  (0.0002)     
France  2.360729 -0.030691 -0.002461 -0.006751 -0.019779 -0.000335  0.2262 1527
 (0.0000)  (0.0504)  (0.1560)  (0.0008) (0.0000)  (0.0812)     
Germany  3.356944 -0.080424 -0.029913 -0.009247 -0.004175 0.027552 0.2160 1050
 (0.0000)  (0.0106)  (0.0007)  (0.1135) (0.1549)  (0.0226)     
Greece  6.744885 -0.404159 -0.090186 0.005264 0.083216 0.093240  0.3089 170 
 (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0085)  (0.3123) (0.0002)  (0.1767)     
Ireland  8.049833 -0.425303 -0.045149 -0.004832 -0.027477 0.051139 0.5251  118 
 (0.0001)  (0.0070)  (0.3778)  (0.6826) (0.0905)  (0.0447)     
Israel 2.442922  0.052242  -0.017246 -0.027214  -0.004359 -0.000150  -0.0203  44 
 (0.4001)  (0.8357)  (0.4699)  (0.2860) (0.7571)  (0.9861)     
Japan 1.115496  0.008129  -0.001013 -0.000949 0.005069 0.057541  0.0588 6590
 (0.0000)  (0.2892)  (0.0037)  (0.2098) (0.0309)  (0.0000)     
Netherlands  3.074044 -0.119836 -0.006372 0.002301 -0.019247 -0.000933  0.3120  417 
 (0.0000)  (0.0221)  (0.0029)  (0.7870) (0.0005)  (0.8941)     
Sweden  4.164318 -0.091159 -0.015245 -0.016903 -0.018813 -0.000021  0.3770  538 
 (0.0000)  (0.0278)  (0.0297)  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.9269)     
Switzerland  2.666084 -0.053663 -0.016739 -0.009590 -0.004189 0.114392 0.1916  448 
 (0.0000)  (0.2587)  (0.0162)  (0.0291) (0.5020)  (0.0025)     
UK  3.009224 -0.102395 -0.057504 0.004385 -0.017141 0.000197 0.2510 2490
 (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0005)  (0.0141) (0.0000)  (0.1779)     
US  2.535999 -0.011656 -0.012255 -0.000493 -0.018364 0.000011 0.2146 9787
 (0.0000)  (0.3379)  (0.1811)  (0.7827) (0.0000)  (0.0204)     
Market 2.659395  -0.037719  0.000005 -0.000204 -0.018077 0.000011 0.2156  14498
 (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.4504)  (0.8850) (0.0000)  (0.0131)     
Bank  1.922571 -0.025430 -0.001640 -0.003334 -0.008278 0.000562 0.0841  10192
 (0.0000)  (0.0003)  (0.0047)  (0.0000) (0.0012)  (0.1862)     
Common 2.623238  -0.033927  0.000006 -0.000058 -0.018092 0.000011 0.2124  13705
 (0.0000)  (0.0004)  (0.3919)  (0.9673) (0.0000)  (0.0135)     
Civil  2.086149 -0.031135 -0.001721 -0.004248 -0.012925 0.000308 0.1261  10985
 (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0050)  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.3281)     
Market (ex-US)  2.863370  -0.098265  0.000007 0.001823 -0.016947 0.000191  0.2426 4711
 (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.2887)  (0.1389) (0.0000)  (0.0175)     
Common (ex-US)  2.823759  -0.100638  0.000009 0.002577 -0.016675 0.000195  0.2265 3918
 (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.1951)  (0.0405) (0.0000)  (0.0196)     
 
   34
Table VI: Country Regressions. Dependant variable is Tobin Q. Independent variables are Log(Assets), the Dividend-Yield (%) (DY), the book 
value of total debt to book value of assets (%) (Debt-Assets), the Return on Assets (%), R&D to Sales (%) and Asset-Sales. High RD is a 
dummy variable = 1 if the firm’s RD-Sales ratio is > 75
th percentile for all firms and = 0 otherwise. Low RD is a dummy variable = 1 for firms 
with Assets-Sales ratios < 25
th percentile for all firms and = 0 otherwise. High Asset-Sales is a dummy variable = 1 for firms with Assets-Sales > 
75
th percentile of all firms and = 0 otherwise. Low Asset-Sales is a dummy variable =1 for firms with Assets-Sales < 25
th percentile for all firms 
and = 0 otherwise. Industry dummies are included in all regressions. The numbers in parentheses are White (1980) adjusted p-values. 














Canada 2.178306  -0.074488  0.000009 0.003596 -0.011313 0.000155 0.314253  0.924141 -0.239414 -0.076461  0.2781 1266
 (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.1295)  (0.0180) (0.0000)  (0.1117)  (0.1498)  (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.3318)     
Denmark 2.370984  0.074894  -0.004368 -0.028051  -0.001324 0.005215 1.111937 0.073296 0.322244 0.734448  0.1785 245 
 (0.0036)  (0.1470)  (0.1785)  (0.0061) (0.8900)  (0.0027)  (0.2260)  (0.9240) (0.1974) (0.0516)     
France  2.425022 -0.028594 -0.002232 -0.007332 -0.020441 -0.000368 -0.269732 0.223755 -0.004065 -0.304442  0.2310 1527
 (0.0000)  (0.0801)  (0.2079)  (0.0003) (0.0000)  (0.1463)  (0.2248)  (0.5933) (0.9608) (0.0019)     
Germany  3.504519 -0.093921 -0.029625 -0.008252 -0.003085 0.018733 0.186026 0.866602 -0.229864 -0.180309  0.2269 1050
 (0.0000)  (0.0029)  (0.0005)  (0.1502) (0.2885)  (0.0932)  (0.4948)  (0.0724) (0.0057) (0.1205)     
Greece  6.950863 -0.383841 -0.080923 0.001790  0.075739 0.158355 -0.657173 -0.635578 -0.369532 -0.632370  0.3256 170 
 (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0110)  (0.7259) (0.0005)  (0.1842)  (0.0088)  (0.3561) (0.1472) (0.0117)     
Ireland  7.315305 -0.392817 -0.023091 -0.003407 -0.025396 0.071019 1.160194 -1.072851 0.496072 0.541397  0.5402 118 
 (0.0002)  (0.0086)  (0.6534)  (0.8072) (0.1377)  (0.0026)  (0.3008)  (0.2237) (0.0984) (0.3207)     
Israel 1.711923  0.156549  -0.009935 -0.033506  -0.003571 0.001449 -0.583715 -0.460995 -0.663306 -0.809038  -0.1099 44 
 (0.6639)  (0.6656)  (0.7102)  (0.2341) (0.8372)  (0.8986)  (0.3827)  (0.4158) (0.3844) (0.2844)     
Japan 1.134455  0.006439  -0.001014 -0.000981  0.004916 0.050438 0.143211 0.208228 0.042328 -0.032955  0.0605 6590
 (0.0000)  (0.4070)  (0.0040)  (0.1921) (0.0347)  (0.0000)  (0.0471)  (0.0844) (0.1787) (0.3689)     
Netherlands  3.164776 -0.128608 -0.006154 0.003046 -0.019044 -0.005913 0.296996 0.577433 -0.161602  -0.099181  0.3092 417 
   (0.0000)  (0.0159)  (0.0031)  (0.7224) (0.0007)  (0.4540)  (0.4859)  (0.2308) (0.3475) (0.6758)     
Sweden  4.113939 -0.089038 -0.015305 -0.016658 -0.018749 -0.000034 -0.134860 0.101322 0.006433 0.073829  0.3728 538 
 (0.0000)  (0.0461)  (0.0334)  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.8746)  (0.5746)  (0.7794) (0.9700) (0.7378)     
Switzerland  2.517672 -0.044875 -0.017241 -0.009469 -0.003666 0.123500 -0.410300 0.008011 0.313210 0.129226  0.1938 448 
   (0.0000)  (0.3414)  (0.0053)  (0.0349) (0.5410)  (0.0006)  (0.0976)  (0.9870) (0.0562) (0.5329)       35
 














UK  3.067332 -0.116170 -0.053584 0.005883 -0.016154 0.000127 0.134637 0.981737 -0.221683  -0.203774  0.2661 2490
 (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0006)  (0.0010) (0.0000)  (0.2905)  (0.4904)  (0.0001) (0.0055) (0.0287)     
US  2.353494 -0.014695 -0.010329 0.001602 -0.015744 0.000008 0.551874 0.964178 -0.407735  -0.227392  0.2454 9787
 (0.0000)  (0.2147)  (0.1651)  (0.3079) (0.0000)  (0.0708)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)     
Market 2.565179  -0.046219  0.000003 0.001721  -0.015727 0.000008 0.445177 0.968544 -0.312040  -0.163068  0.2424 14498
 (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.6830)  (0.1645) (0.0000)  (0.0525)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)     
Bank  2.029346 -0.038773 -0.001621 -0.002726 -0.007573 0.000261 0.408452 0.739777 0.018315 -0.092042  0.0963 10192
 (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0040)  (0.0004) (0.0034)  (0.4607)  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.5245) (0.01000     
Common 2.519282  -0.042229  0.000003 0.001904  -0.015624 0.000008 0.487874 0.987695 -0.332564  -0.183536  0.2414 13705
 (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.6195)  (0.1241) (0.0000)  (0.0542)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)     
Civil  2.163956 -0.042587 -0.001689 -0.003618 -0.012145 0.000111 0.326977 0.755579 0.025214 -0.068630  0.1363 10985
 (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0044)  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.6671)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.3716) (0.0571)     
Market (ex-US)  2.869653  -0.106821  0.000006 0.002978  -0.015847 0.000130 0.148488 0.816839 -0.168534 -0.090867  0.2554 4711
 (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.3602  (0.0146)  (0.0000)  (0.0686) (0.2533)  (0.0000)  (0.0018) (0.1473)     
Common (ex-US)  2.839062  -0.111000  0.000008 0.003781  -0.015395 0.000134 0.259058 0.894510 -0.184262 -0.109611  0.2436 3918
 (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.2444)  (0.0027) (0.0000)  (0.0737)  (0.0941)  (0.0000) (0.0019) (0.1008)     
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Table VII: Industry Regressions. Dependant variable is Tobin Q. Independent variables are Log(Assets), the Dividend-Yield (%) (DY), the book 
value of total debt to book value of assets (%) (Debt-Assets), the Return on Assets (%), R&D to Sales (%) and Asset-Sales. Industry dummies 
are included in all regressions. The column marked “Low” shows results for those industries with low R&D intensity and the Column marked 
“High” shows results for high R&D intensity industries. The numbers in parentheses are White (1980) adjusted p-values. Country and Annual 
dummies included. (Zero and Six do not include all country dummies and Nine has no country dummies). 
 Zero  One  Two  Three  Four  Five  Six  Seven  Eight  Nine 
C -1.181049 2.029931 1.826631 2.558863 2.710230 1.791870 2.935609 4.133055 2.483130 -1.372606
  (0.7514) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.2939) 
Log(Assets) 0.251598  -0.077187 0.049676 -0.005469 -0.064405 0.008019 -0.120064 -0.098666 -0.009224 0.292943
  (0.4307) (0.0005) (0.00050 (0.6373) (0.0000) (0.5979) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.8504) (0.0296) 
DY -0.362720 -0.000684 -0.015859 -0.004604 -0.000231 -0.001088  -0.001057 0.000008 -0.032702 -0.180705
  (0.3844) (0.0765) (0.0649) (0.2429) (0.2238) (0.1555) (0.0424) (0.0782) (0.0000) (0.3440) 
Debt-Assets 0.007131 0.006798 -0.003607 -0.005183 -0.000946 -0.002846 0.000793 -0.000162 -0.001330 -0.005180
  (0.7325) (0.0000) (0.0107) (0.0012) (0.6645) (0.1255) (0.6437) (0.9091) (0.7691) (0.6667) 
RoA 0.083149  -0.011454 -0.023860 -0.020843 -0.019969 -0.009899 -0.013308 -0.015145 -0.020320 0.069100
  (0.0613) (0.1024) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0018) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0316) 
RD-Sales -0.294105 -0.000122 0.000003 0.000083 0.000634 0.004485  0.001734 0.000013 -0.000007 -0.179869
  (0.4829) (0.0812) (0.4814) (0.0462) (0.1719) (0.0510) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.8909) (0.0524) 
Adj-R
2  0.1276 0.3065 0.2700 0.2229 0.2644 0.1015 0.2161 0.1869 0.1955 0.3202 
N  92  1786 4144 7366 2078 3644 1451 3267  843  16 
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Table VIII: Industry and Agency Cost Regressions. Dependant variable is Tobin Q. Independent variables are Log(Assets), the Dividend-Yield 
(%) (DY), the book value of total debt to book value of assets (%) (Debt-Assets), the Return on Assets (%), R&D to Sales (%) and Asset-Sales. 
High RD is a dummy variable = 1 if the firm’s RD-Sales ratio is > 75
th percentile for all firms and = 0 otherwise. Low RD is a dummy variable = 
1 for firms with Assets-Sales ratios < 25
th percentile for all firms and = 0 otherwise. High Asset-Sales is a dummy variable = 1 for firms with 
Assets-Sales > 75
th percentile of all firms and = 0 otherwise. Low Asset-Sales is a dummy variable =1 for firms with Assets-Sales < 25
th 
percentile for all firms and = 0 otherwise. The numbers in parentheses are White (1980) adjusted p-values. Country and Annual dummies 
included. (Zero and Six do not include all country dummies). 
  Zero  One Two  Three  Four Five Six Seven  Eight 
C 5.272267 2.106102 1.603729 2.521274 2.731303 1.724897 3.438854 4.082257 2.293706
  (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.00000 (0.0000) (0.0001) 
Log(Assets) -0.37104 -0.082688 0.034866 -0.021121 -0.064139 0.007290 -0.102114 -0.100819 -0.029996
  (0.0039) (0.0003) (0.0240) (0.0663) (0.0001) (0.6327) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.5545) 
DY -0.16258 -0.000710 -0.012250 -0.004170 -0.000228  -0.001083 -0.001324 0.000007 -0.026985
  (0.0570) (0.0706) (0.0526) (0.2363) (0.2313) (0.1580) (0.0002) (0.1466) (0.0000) 
Debt-Assets 0.012958 0.006860 0.000147 -0.003113 -0.000903 -0.002340 0.000361 0.001583 0.002817
  (0.2151) (0.0000) (0.9221) (0.0340) (0.6762) (0.2209) (0.8332) (0.2553) (0.5506) 
RoA 0.030342 -0.011298 -0.019291 -0.018096 -0.020056  -0.008978 -0.012905 -0.013773 -0.016161
  (0.3103) (0.1084) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0074) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0003) 
RD-Sales 0.081409 -0.000144 0.000000 0.000067 0.000663 0.003915 0.001167 0.000012 -0.000032
  (0.4659) (0.0345) (0.9698) (0.0651) (0.1732) (0.0876) (0.0245) (0.0000) (0.4586) 
HighRD*HighAsset-Sales 0.103139 0.090859 0.549017 0.494272 -0.282578 0.600925 0.400119 0.249753 1.399128
  (0.8447) (0.4490) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.3641) (0.0369) (0.5612) (0.1851) (0.0227) 
HighRD*LowAsset-Sales 0.086236 0.088946 1.184614 0.909631 0.018783 0.922241 -0.276137 0.670066 1.450261
  (0.9368) (0.2798) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.9425) (0.0963) (0.6188) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
LowRD*HighAsset-Sales -0.09503 -0.162970 -0.233568 -0.287350 -0.050657  0.025307 -0.430046 -0.449575 -0.017901
  (0.7404) (0.0026) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.5748) (0.6033) (0.0283) (0.0000) (0.9124) 
LowRD*LowAsset-Sales -0.24935 -0.003146 0.049545 -0.124317 -0.037870 0.127624 -0.833344 -0.547403 0.143177
  (0.4707) (0.9600) (0.4956) (0.0366) (0.6182) (0.0687) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.5113) 
Adj-R
2  0.1909  0.3097 0.3127 0.2486 0.2636 0.1076 0.2670 0.2065 0.2341 
N  92  1786 4144 7366 2078 3644 1451 3267  843   38
Table IV: High and Low R&D Industry Regressions. Dependant variable is Tobin Q. Independent variables are Log(Assets), the Dividend-Yield 
(%) (DY), the book value of total debt to book value of assets (%) (Debt-Assets), the Return on Assets (%), R&D to Sales (%) and Asset-Sales. 
Country dummies are included in first two regressions. The column marked “Low” shows results for those industries with low R&D intensity 
and the Column marked “High” shows results for high R&D intensity industries. Market indicates market – based economies, Bank indicates 
Bank – based economies, Common indicates Common law economies and Civil indicates Civil Law economies. The numbers in parentheses are 
White (1980) adjusted p-values. 
     Market  Bank  Common  Civil 
  Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High 
C 2.539768 3.063400 2.521434 3.063356 2.047673 2.556964 2.515434 2.937274 2.030830 2.999959
 (0.0000)  (0.00000 (0.0000)  (0.00000 (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Log(Assets) -0.041836 -0.040654 -0.047165 -0.047428 -0.051638 -0.052301 -0.047198 -0.037241 -0.026588 -0.083343
 (0.0000)  (0.0009)  (0.0001)  (0.0029) (0.0000) (0.0008) (0.0002) (0.0242) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
DY -0.000816 0.000016 -0.000795 0.000007 -0.001251 -0.015483  -0.000729 0.000007 -0.001358 -0.015797
 (0.0702)  (0.0003)  (0.1276)  (0.2343) (0.0017) (0.0507) (0.1225) (0.2349) (0.0030) (0.0201) 
Debt-Assets -0.001674 -0.001156 -0.000816 -0.000116 -0.001429 -0.003541 -0.000559 -0.000176 -0.004873 -0.002982
 (0.3919)  (0.3048)  (0.7133)  (0.9258) (0.0936) (0.0417) (0.7995) (0.8884) (0.0000) (0.1158) 
RoA -0.017943 -0.017760 -0.018982 -0.017872 0.000002 -0.015178 -0.018744 -0.018044 -0.010722 -0.016620
 (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.9993) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0004) (0.0000) 
RD-Sales 0.000103 0.000010 0.000101 0.000010 0.080421 0.000369 0.000102 0.000010 0.000262 0.000371
 (0.0404)  (0.0341)  (0.0387)  (0.0270) (0.0000) (0.2563) (0.0405) (0.0265) (0.5234) (0.2676) 
Adj-R
2  0.1846 0.2144 0.1868 0.1814 0.0617 0.0763 0.1813 0.1819 0.0416 0.1100 
N  16436  8254 9235 5262 7198 2992 8754 4950 7679 3304 
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Table X: R&D and Agency cost Industry Regressions. Dependant variable is Tobin Q. Independent variables are Log(Assets), the Dividend-
Yield (%) (DY), the book value of total debt to book value of assets (%) (Debt-Assets), the Return on Assets (%), R&D to Sales (%) and Asset-
Sales. Country dummies are included in first two regressions. The column marked “Low” shows results for those industries with low R&D 
intensity and the Column marked “High” shows results for high R&D intensity industries. Market indicates market–based economies, Bank 
indicates Bank–based economies, Common indicates Common law economies and Civil indicates Civil Law economies. The numbers in 
parentheses are White (1980) adjusted p-values. 
     Market  Bank  Common  Civil 
 Low  High  Low High Low High Low High Low High 
C 2.519449 2.971091 2.497631 2.967508 2.044830 2.615739 2.467096 2.854751 2.100562 3.009326
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Log(Assets) -0.046782 -0.054850 -0.045922 -0.058568 -0.054087 -0.063889 -0.043932 -0.050268 -0.038772 -0.091328
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0024) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
DY -0.000724 0.000014 -0.000609 0.000004 -0.001239 -0.015010 -0.000542 0.000004 -0.001329 -0.015186
  (0.0808) (0.0005) (0.1473) (0.4290) (0.0021) (0.0508) (0.1458) (0.4500) (0.0031) (0.0203) 
Debt-Assets -0.000382 0.001321 0.000815 0.002914 -0.001340 -0.002863 0.001126 0.002951 -0.004129 -0.002402
  (0.8342) (0.2333) (0.6818) (0.0182) (0.1198) (0.0839) (0.5649) (0.0181) (0.0000) (0.1918) 
RoA -0.016137 -0.015300 -0.016967 -0.015049 0.000049 -0.014403 -0.016615 -0.015017 -0.009711 -0.015958
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.9854) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0016) (0.0000) 
RD-Sales 0.000081 0.000007 0.000079 0.000007 0.074820 0.000145 0.000080 0.000007 0.000091 0.000105
  (0.0492) (0.1300) (0.0480) (0.1274) (0.0000) (0.6280) (0.0506) (0.1250) (0.7966) (0.7196) 
HighRD*HighAsset-Sales 0.444636 0.524057 0.382968 0.501957 0.237621 0.284240 0.435787 0.532829 0.334708 0.260196
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0472) (0.0198) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0356) 
HighRD*LowAsset-Sales 0.786812 1.030307 0.758703 1.113753 0.302857 0.718225 0.785627 1.126949 0.830453 0.767383
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0390) (0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
LowRD*HighAsset-Sales -0.172538 -0.286241 -0.335300 -0.427335 0.074693 0.098504 -0.348002 -0.472095 0.045221 0.113586
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0150) (0.1361) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.1250) (0.0827) 
LowRD*LowAsset-Sales -0.190302 -0.125851 -0.316762 -0.173584 0.050292 -0.051429 -0.341125 -0.194442 0.023857 -0.017955
  (0.0000) (0.0286) (0.0000) (0.0361) (0.1486) (0.4636) (0.0000) (0.0226) (0.4863) (0.8065) 
Adj-R
2  0.2058 0.2410 0.2153 0.2168 0.0640 0.0856 0.2128 0.2203 0.0540 0.1183 
N  16436  8254 9235 5262 7198 2992 8754 4950 7679 3304 
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Table XI: Segmented Summary Statistics. Data are segmented by extent of R&D 
intensity and also by Agency costs. The final panel shows t-statistics. 
 Asset-Sales  Debt-Assets DY  Q  RD-Sales RoA  Log(Asset) 
Mean 210.04  55.92  6.97  1.76  88.47  -3.58  12.39 
Median 96.53  55.52  0.30  1.17  0.00  3.04  12.22 
Std. Dev.  3581.92  33.63  626.56 1.74 4352.31  35.75  1.99 
SE 22.7958  0.2140  3.9875  0.0111  27.6987  0.2275  0.0127 
N 24690  24690  24690  24690  24690  24690  24690 
HighRD*HighAsset-Sales 
 Asset-Sales  Debt-Assets DY  Q  RD-Sales RoA  Log(Asset) 
Mean 861.15  61.26  0.79  2.64  145.07  -21.17  11.93 
Median 188.17  51.70  0.00  1.67  6.37  0.50  11.70 
Std. Dev.  6321.05  61.97  2.26 2.48  1042.17  62.75  2.47 
SE 198.6024  1.95  0.0710  0.0779 32.7442 1.9716  0.0776 
N  1013  1013  1013  1013 1013 1013  1013 
HighRD*LowAsset-Sales 
 Asset-Sales  Debt-Assets DY  Q  RD-Sales RoA  Log(Asset) 
Mean 31.15  36.63  0.31  3.32  1161.29  -31.76  12.06 
Median 33.79  26.29  0.00  2.37  24.75  -12.76  11.87 
Std. Dev.  18.14  36.67  1.32  2.83  16403.38 63.16  2.16 
SE 0.4365  0.8823  0.0318  0.0681  394.7182 1.5198  0.0520 
N  1727  1727  1727  1727 1727 1727  1727 
LowRD*HighAsset-Sales 
 Asset-Sales  Debt-Assets DY  Q  RD-Sales RoA  Log(Asset) 
Mean 562.78  61.00  2.09  1.49  0.00  0.68  12.24 
Median 201.89  60.26  0.49  1.11  0.00  3.96  12.12 
Std. Dev.  7323.22  31.40  9.75  1.28  0.00  29.99  1.89 
SE 102.2752  0.4385  0.1362  0.0179  0.0000  0.4188  0.0264 
N  5127  5127  5127  5127 5127 5127  5127 
LowRD*LowAsset-Sales 
 Asset-Sales  Debt-Assets DY  Q  RD-Sales RoA  Log(Asset) 
Mean 33.54  56.24  3.47  1.58  0.00  -3.06  12.54 
Median 36.04  56.61  0.33  1.11  0.00  2.72  12.41 
Std. Dev.  17.24  39.75  52.42  1.56  0.00  31.99  2.10 
SE 0.2624  0.6051  0.7978  0.0237  0.0000  0.4869  0.0320 
N  4317  4317  4317  4317 4317 4317  4317 
 Asset-Sales  Debt-Assets DY  Q  RD-Sales RoA  Log(Asset) 
HighRD*HighAgency -2.9409  -2.4686  1.5227  -9.8876 -0.9364 7.9987  5.0941 
HighRD*LowAgency 7.7001  17.5918 1.6570 -19.6970 -2.5397  16.1277  5.1005 
LowRD*HighAgency -2.8203  -7.7855 1.1834  9.3103 3.1940 -6.5914  3.8363 
LowRD*LowAgency 7.6545  -0.3955  0.7314  5.1724  3.1940  -0.7279  -3.3557 
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Table XII: Break down of High R&D High Agency Cost Firms. The number of such 
firm years by economy, Legal Family, Financial Structure and Industry. 
  Firm Years % RD Year %Total Years
Canada 59  19.16  4.61 
Denmark 8  18.60  3.21 
France 14  10.07  0.91 
Germany 28  12.50  2.64 
Greece 5  10.20  2.92 
Ireland 0  0.00  0.00 
Israel 3  10.00  6.82 
Japan 143  12.75  2.16 
Netherlands 7  12.73  1.67 
Sweden 28  20.29  5.11 
Switzerland 16  10.53  3.56 
UK 102  16.06  4.04 
US 595  15.74  5.93 
Market 791  16.09  5.34 
Bank 222  12.42  2.17 
Common 764  15.98  5.45 
Civil 249  12.96  2.25 
Market (ex-US)  196  17.25  4.11 
Common (ex-US) 169  16.88  4.26 
Industry0 7  29.17  7.53 
Industry1 63  19.81  3.51 
Industry2 202  15.26  4.82 
Industry3 430  13.87  5.76 
Industry4 35  15.77  1.67 
Industry5 52  24.88  1.42 
Industry6 9  19.57  0.61 
Industry7 188  14.71  5.51 
Industry8 27  15.08  3.18 
Industry9 0  0.00  0.00 
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Table XIII: R&D and Agency Cost Regressions. Data are segmented by whether firms 
have high R&D and High or Low Agency Costs.. Dependant variable is Tobin Q. 
Independent variables are Log(Assets), the Dividend-Yield (%) (DY), the book value 
of total debt to book value of assets (%) (Debt-Assets), the Return on Assets (%), 
R&D to Sales (%) and Asset-Sales. Industry dummies are included in all regressions. 
High RD is a dummy variable = 1 if the firm’s RD-Sales ratio is > 75
th percentile for 
all firms and = 0 otherwise. High Agency is a dummy variable = 1 for firms with 
Assets-Sales > 75
th percentile of all firms and = 0 otherwise. Low Agency is a dummy 
variable =1 for firms with Assets-Sales < 25
th percentile for all firms and = 0 
otherwise. The numbers in parentheses are White (1980) adjusted p-values. Country 
and Annual dummies included. 
 HighRD*HighAsset-Sales HighRD*LowAsset-Sales 
C 4.382050  4.756862 
 (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Log(Assets) -0.156364  -0.114940 
 (0.0000)  (0.0008) 
DY -0.075911  -0.133238 
 (0.0023)  (0.0000) 
Debt-Assets 0.005022  0.001914 
 (0.0004)  (0.4290) 
RoA -0.011868 -0.015443 
 (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
RD-Sales 0.000214  0.000007 
 (0.0983)  (0.1268) 
Adj-R
2 0.2957  0.2214 
N 1013 1727 
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APPENDIX 1: SIC Codes and Groupings. 
 
 
Industry 0 Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries 
Industry 1 Mineral Industries 
Industry 2 Primary, Chemical and Petroleum Industries 
Industry 3 Manufacturing and Equipment 
Industry 4 Transportation, Communications, and Utilities 
Industry 5 Wholesale and Retail Trade 
Industry 6 Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate 
Industry 7 Personal and Business Services 
Industry 8 Service (Other) Industries 
Industry 9 Public Administration 
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APPENDIX 2: Market – Based and Common Law Classifications 
Common Law is an indicator of whether the economy has a common law legal system 
(or a civil law system) both taken from La Porta et al. (1997). Market-Based is an 
indicator of whether the economy has a market based or bank based financial structure 
taken from Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002). 
 
Financial 
Structure  Legal System
Canada Market  Common 
Denmark Bank  Civil 
France Bank  Civil 
Germany Bank  Civil 
Greece Bank  Civil 
Ireland Bank  Common 
Israel Bank  Common 
Japan Bank  Civil 
Netherlands Market Civil 
Sweden Market Civil 
Switzerland Bank Civil 
UK Market  Common 





                                                 
1 These mechanisms include, but are not limited to, requiring managers and directors 
to hold stock in the firm, dividend policy and debt policy. 
2 We have also estimated equation (1) with debt-equity ratios, using the market value 
of equity. Results are qualitatively similar and tables are available on request. 
3 The database is described in documentation found at www.bvdep.com. 
4 These economies were chosen on the basis that Osiris contained a reasonable 
number of firms with R&D expenditure. This, of course, introduces some sample bias 
into the analysis. All international comparison studies suffer from this bias. 
5 See for example Ali and Hwang (2000) who find accounting value relevance to be 
higher in market – based economies. Similarly, Francis, Khurana and Pereira (2001) 
report that civil law economies have less timely and transparent accounting than do 
common law economies. All these differences we believe will be captured by dummy 
variables in the pooled regressions and/or will be captured when we pool the data into 
market – based or common law economies and so on. Our data source, described 
above, also minimizes the differences that might otherwise be expected. 
6 The figure as it stands may strike readers as being excessive. In order to evaluate the 
veracity of the 211.66 percent figure we examined the firms that generated the largest 
R&D observations. Many of the firms could plausibly be expected to have high R&D 
expenditure and many were listed on the NASDAQ. This gives us greater confidence 
in the very high level of R&D for the US. 
7 We took a radical approach to the identification of outliers. After estimating 
equation (1) we calculated the absolute value of the Studentized residuals. There were 
160 Studentized residuals greater than two. When we examined the absolute value of 
the residuals themselves there were 364 observations with a value greater than 10. We  46
                                                                                                                                            
eliminated these 364 observations from the sample. If anything, we have over 
compensated for outliers in the analysis. Given our large sample size, however, we do 
not believe this approach would bias the results. 
8 Country level versions of column one are shown in table V and industry versions in 
table VII. 
9 The 75
th percentile for R&D to Sales is fairly low as most firms in our sample either 
do not report R&D or do not undertake R&D. The median for high R&D firms is 7.5 
percent while the median for the firms in the 25
th percentile is zero. 
10 The country level version of this equation is shown in table VI, while the industry 
version is shown in table VIII. 
11 We will present evidence in section four indicating that debt operates as a constraint 
on agency costs for these firms. 
12 Industry 8 (Service (Other) Industries) in particular has a high HighRD*LowAsset-
Sales coefficient. The standard error for that coefficient is 0.3313 giving a t–statistic 
of 1.3588 for hypothesis that the coefficient is not equal to unity. 
13 Readers should note that the high and low R&D intensity industries do not coincide 
with the high-tech and low-tech dichotomy that Chan et al. (1990) employ. 